Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.003zbMath1255.91169OpenAlexW1993555801MaRDI QIDQ1934769

Gregory Pavlov

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The effectiveness of English auctions.
• Coarse Matching

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