Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1978524
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00236-0zbMath0945.91033WikidataQ127015929 ScholiaQ127015929MaRDI QIDQ1978524
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations, The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games, Trust with private and common property: effects of stronger property right entitlements
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
- Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
- Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence