Optimal customer behavior in observable and unobservable discrete-time queues
Publication:2031329
DOI10.3934/jimo.2019112zbMath1474.60210OpenAlexW2977718838MaRDI QIDQ2031329
Publication date: 9 June 2021
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2019112
equilibrium behaviordiscrete-time queueprofit maximizationprice of anarchystrategic customerssocial optimization
Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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