A stealthy hardware Trojan based on a statistical fault attack
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Publication:2120995
DOI10.1007/s12095-021-00480-4zbMath1492.94148OpenAlexW3137913022MaRDI QIDQ2120995
Olivier Bronchain, Charles Momin, François-Xavier Standaert
Publication date: 1 April 2022
Published in: Cryptography and Communications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12095-021-00480-4
Cites Work
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- Mode-level vs. implementation-level physical security in symmetric cryptography. A practical guide through the leakage-resistance jungle
- The first thorough side-channel hardware Trojan
- A Differential Fault Attack Technique against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES and Khazad
- Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis
- Advanced Encryption Standard – AES
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