The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
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Publication:2195049
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.045zbMath1446.91022OpenAlexW2059433670WikidataQ81417877 ScholiaQ81417877MaRDI QIDQ2195049
Hannelore Brandt, Karl Sigmund
Publication date: 7 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.045
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Cites Work
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- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
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- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
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