A dynamic analysis of Schelling's binary corruption model: a competitive equilibrium approach
Publication:2247908
DOI10.1007/s10957-013-0420-7zbMath1291.91178OpenAlexW2103862968WikidataQ59211970 ScholiaQ59211970MaRDI QIDQ2247908
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger, Dieter Grass, Andreas J. Novak, Andrea Seidl, Richard F. Hartl, Peter M. Kort, Franz Wirl
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0420-7
thresholdscorruptionhistory versus expectationsintertemporal competitive equilibriaSchelling diagram
Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Optimality conditions for problems involving ordinary differential equations (49K15)
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