Strategic arrivals to queues offering priority service

DOI10.1007/s11134-019-09604-3zbMath1429.91082arXiv1704.05986OpenAlexW2608922470WikidataQ128344501 ScholiaQ128344501MaRDI QIDQ2281371

Rajat Talak, D. Manjunath, Alexandre Proutiere

Publication date: 19 December 2019

Published in: Queueing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.05986

zbMATH Keywords

pricingservice differentiationpriority queuesgames in queuesstrategic arrivals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items (1)

Preemptible queues with advance reservations: strategic behavior and revenue management

Cites Work

• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
• The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Stable priority purchasing in queues
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Optimal Pricing of Priority Services
• Mean Field Games and Applications
• Pricing and Priority Auctions in Queueing Systems with a Generalized Delay Cost Structure
• Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time
• Strategic Arrivals into Queueing Networks: The Network Concert Queueing Game
• Priority Pricing
• Optimum Bribing for Queue Position
• Purchasing Priorities in Queues
• Existence of pure equilibria in games with nonatomic space of players

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