Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.003zbMath1218.91108OpenAlexW2063149883MaRDI QIDQ2275670

Anthony Dukes, Tansev Geylani, Esther Gal-Or

Publication date: 9 August 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

retailinginformation sharingpricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (3)

Demand signal transmission in a certified refurbishing supply chain: rules and incentive analysis ⋮ Information sharing in an MTO supply chain with upstream adjustments ⋮ Group-buying and channel coordination under asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly

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