A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9445-0zbMath1378.91015OpenAlexW2250799645MaRDI QIDQ2353604

Bertrand Tchantcho, Sébastien Courtin

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9445-0

zbMATH Keywords

power indicescoalition structuredesirability relationvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention ⋮ Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks

Cites Work

• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• A class of simple games
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations
• Economic power and values of games
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