Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005zbMath1157.91411MaRDI QIDQ2373771

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

lattice; matching; core; competitive equilibrium; setwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B60: Trade models

91B68: Matching models

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