Stability in dynamic matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014zbMath1099.91076MaRDI QIDQ2387312

Ricky Lam, Ettore Damiano

Publication date: 2 September 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014

zbMATH Keywords

Credibility; Recursive core; Repeated matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B62: Economic growth models

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Matching While Learning, Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem, Dynamically stable matching, Stability in repeated matching markets, Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets, Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching, Influencing waiting lists, Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information, Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade, Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers, Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

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