The paradox of multiple elections

DOI10.1007/S003550050101zbMath1066.91516OpenAlexW2010224528MaRDI QIDQ2386269

William S. Zwicker, D. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050101

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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