The Borda count and agenda manipulation
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Publication:2386273
DOI10.1007/s003550050105zbMath1066.91517MaRDI QIDQ2386273
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050105
91B12: Voting theory
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