A modified ``winner-take-all rule for awarding state electoral votes in US presidential elections and a game model for its analysis

DOI10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.034zbMath1187.91176OpenAlexW1968023163MaRDI QIDQ2389763

A. S. Belen'kij

Publication date: 18 July 2009

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.034

zbMATH Keywords

electoral collegepopular voteelectoral voteconnected strategiesgames on polyhedral sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

New paradigms towards the modelling of complex systems in behavioral economics

Cites Work

• A mathematical model for estimating the potential margin of state undecided voters for a candidate in a US federal election
• A 2-person game on a polyhedral set of connected strategies
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