Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028zbMath1283.91059OpenAlexW3123659481MaRDI QIDQ2439798

Rune Midjord

Publication date: 17 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/8771

zbMATH Keywords

direct mechanismrank-order tournamentsverifiable informationfull implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide

Cites Work

• Implementation with partial provability
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation with evidence
• The Wage Policy of a Firm

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