Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

DOI10.1007/s10058-006-0017-9zbMath1136.91542OpenAlexW2106345813MaRDI QIDQ2463787

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 6 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143511

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcouples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (12)

Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions) ⋮ Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets ⋮ Fair and efficient student placement with couples ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Matching with partners and projects ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ⋮ Preference aggregation for couples

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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