Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1zbMath1113.91033MaRDI QIDQ2505520

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 26 September 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proof; Pareto dominance relation; envy-freeness; Groves mechanism; decision-efficiency; indivisble goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B18: Public goods

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion, Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences, Explicitly simple near-tie auctions, Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity, Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem, Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem, The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation, Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets, Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms, Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities, Consistent house allocation, Vickrey allocation rule with income effect, Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness, Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations, Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness, Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects, Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money, An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear, Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains, No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem, Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices, Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money, Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem, Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money, Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms, No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects, Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement, Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities, Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms, Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good, Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint, Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation, Joint misrepresentation with bribes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Games of fair division
• A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• House allocation with transfers