A characterization of the position value

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0211-yzbMath1091.91006MaRDI QIDQ2576648

Marco Slikker

Publication date: 14 December 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/fdb2d34e-3863-4ea7-a160-2adfb21c15c6

zbMATH Keywords

characterization; position value; Communication situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

On the Position Value for Special Classes of Networks, Fuzzy Average Tree Solution for Graph Games with Fuzzy Coalitions, Power surplus solutions for weighted hypergraph communication situations, Marginality and the position value, Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games, A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions, Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games, Outside option values for network games, Networked control design for coalitional schemes using game-theoretic methods, Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games, Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures, Graph monotonic values, An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes, A linear proportional effort allocation rule, The degree value for games with communication structure, Efficient extensions of communication values, Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure, The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure, Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication, An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations, The \(cg\)-position value for games on fuzzy communication structures, A probabilistic position value, The position value and the structures of graphs, Probabilistic network values, The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure, Marginality and Myerson values, The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense, Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems, The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games, Values for games with two-level communication structures, Adaptive allocation rules for hypergraph games, A coalitional control scheme with applications to cooperative game theory, A Note on the Position Value for Hypergraph Communication Situations