Policy bias equivalence under common agency

DOI10.1007/s00712-006-0239-xzbMath1206.91073OpenAlexW2083237410MaRDI QIDQ2642564

Mike Felgenhauer

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0239-x

zbMATH Keywords

common agencylobbyingcommon value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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