A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1782zbMath1277.91013OpenAlexW2000423920MaRDI QIDQ2867498

António Osório

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/179667

zbMATH Keywords

Brownian motionpublic monitoringfrequent monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals

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