Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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Publication:3057835
DOI10.3982/ECTA8354zbMath1203.91201MaRDI QIDQ3057835
Publication date: 17 November 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
asymptotic equivalence; probabilistic serial; random assignment; ordinal efficiency; random priority mechanism
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