A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1040.0230zbMath1232.91300MaRDI QIDQ3115434

Jérémie Gallien, Lawrence M. Wein

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0230

zbMATH Keywords

best response; procurement auctions; smart markets; iterative bidding mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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