Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model

DOI10.2307/2526848zbMath0713.90016MaRDI QIDQ3199168

Matti Pohjola, Veijo Kaitala

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526848

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto-optimal solutions; redistributive taxation; feedback Nash equilibrium; memory strategies; agreeable growth; dynamic noncooperative economic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)

91B62: Economic growth models

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

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