Bargaining under Asymmetric Information

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Publication:3346120


DOI10.2307/1911195zbMath0552.90102MaRDI QIDQ3346120

William F. Samuelson

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911195


91A12: Cooperative games

91A05: 2-person games


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