Publication:3430415
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zbMath1124.91018MaRDI QIDQ3430415
Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn
Publication date: 21 March 2007
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B12: Voting theory
91B14: Social choice
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