The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
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Publication:3428547
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.xzbMath1138.91596MaRDI QIDQ3428547
B. Douglas Bernheim, Luis Rayo, Antonio Rangel
Publication date: 27 March 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x
majority rule; legislative bargaining; dictator; agenda setting; distributive politics; pork barrel politics
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