Manipulation of k-Approval in Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_5zbMath1405.91152OpenAlexW2260773495MaRDI QIDQ3449523

Martin Lackner, Andreas Pfandler, Gábor Erdélyi

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_5

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremNP-hardnessmanipulationvoting ruleelection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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