Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria

DOI10.2307/2526628zbMath0701.90014OpenAlexW1974490199MaRDI QIDQ3479761

Nirvikar Singh, Kaushik Basu

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526628

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceprecommitmentlimit pricing modelpost- entry market behaviorStackelberg perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (3)

Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant ⋮ Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly ⋮ Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look

This page was built for publication: Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria