Strategic Information Revelation

DOI10.2307/2297541zbMath0703.90103MaRDI QIDQ3483115

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Kotaro Suzumura, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297541

zbMATH Keywords

information revelation; seller; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; buyer; asymmetric information game; oligopolists; nonpublic information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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