Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit

DOI10.3982/ECTA7324zbMath1194.91049MaRDI QIDQ3576884

Sylvain Chassang

Publication date: 3 August 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamescooperationglobal gamesexit gamesfear of miscoordinationlocal dominance solvability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44) Dynamic games (91A25)

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