Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users

DOI10.1145/780542.780618zbMath1192.68032MaRDI QIDQ3581254

Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden, Richard John Cole

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780618

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme, Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators, Pricing bridges to cross a river, Bertrand Competition in Networks, An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management, On the stability of finding approximate fixed points by simplicial methods, A generalized two-agent location problem: Asymmetric dynamics and coordination, Existence and computation of optimal tolls in multiclass network equilibrium problems, Coordination mechanisms, Transfer implementation in congestion games, Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands, Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks, Non-atomic one-round walks in congestion games, Toll caps in privatized road networks, A network pricing game for selfish traffic, Optimal externalities in a parallel transportation network, The minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows, Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms, Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions, Demand allocation with latency cost functions, The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric, How much can taxes help selfish routing?, On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard, Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria, Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks, Negative prices in network pricing games, The Cost of Free Spectrum, Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate, On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users, Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes