A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
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Publication:3601184
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00520.xzbMath1153.91395MaRDI QIDQ3601184
S. N. Slavov, B. Douglas Bernheim
Publication date: 10 February 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00520.x
91B14: Social choice
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