Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms
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Publication:3608844
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_20zbMath1206.90041MaRDI QIDQ3608844
Fanny Pascual, Laurent Gourvès, George Christodoulou
Publication date: 6 March 2009
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5907
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