First Mover and Second Mover Advantages

DOI10.2307/2526710zbMath0573.90106MaRDI QIDQ3691449

Esther Gal-Or

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526710

zbMATH Keywords

reaction functions; sequential move; two identical players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

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