Stability and Collective Rationality

DOI10.2307/1911037zbMath0622.90007MaRDI QIDQ3760257

Terje Lensberg

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911037

zbMATH Keywords

continuity; Pareto optimality; collective choice; bilateral stability; additively separable Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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