Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts

DOI10.2307/2297404zbMath0649.90025MaRDI QIDQ3795450

Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7f1d50d943fd69ca86f9dd660f156559d6c196eb

zbMATH Keywords

labor market; risk-neutral firm; long-term wage contracts; random spot market wage; risk-averse worker

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91B60: Trade models

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