The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

DOI10.1287/moor.13.4.619zbMath0664.90075MaRDI QIDQ3815875

No author found.

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6a769ab83567767d2eb2f3fd0118ed9cc0aa02e

zbMATH Keywords

lattice; labor market; matching problem; stable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C27: Combinatorial optimization

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

05C70: Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.)

91B08: Individual preferences

06B99: Lattices

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