Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
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Publication:3833834
DOI10.2307/1912573zbMath0677.90011MaRDI QIDQ3833834
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912573
Shapley value; coalition; exchange economy; transferable utility; coalition formation; noncooperative bargaining; dynamic bargaining; random matching; effective equilibria; games in characteristic function form; stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A12: Cooperative games
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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