Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels

DOI10.2307/2297001zbMath0432.90008MaRDI QIDQ3870623

Kevin W. S. Roberts

Publication date: 1980

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297001

zbMATH Keywords

social choice; dictatorship; interpersonal comparisons; choice rules; Arrow's general possibility theorem; ordinality; possibility theorems; extended orderings; interpersonally comparable welfare levels; single-focus rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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