Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible

DOI10.2307/2297047zbMath0441.90003OpenAlexW2035120086MaRDI QIDQ3883836

Theodore Groves

Publication date: 1979

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297047

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcollective choicedominant strategyefficient outcomesdecision mechanismcompensatory payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities ⋮ Note on the core and compensation in collective choice ⋮ Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations ⋮ Distributed project scheduling with information sharing in supply chains: part II—theoretical analysis and computational study ⋮ Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents ⋮ Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons ⋮ Research in decision theory: A personal perspective ⋮ New optimality principles for economic efficiency and equilibrium

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