An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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Publication:3970124
DOI10.2307/1912246zbMath0503.90018OpenAlexW3124071598WikidataQ56213601 ScholiaQ56213601MaRDI QIDQ3970124
Oliver D. Hart, Sanford J. Grossman
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391749000000000339.pdf
moral hazardrisk sharingprincipal-agent problemuncertain environmentmarket allocations under uncertaintyoptimal incentive scheme
Convex programming (90C25) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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