Publication:4197570
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zbMath0409.90006MaRDI QIDQ4197570
David Schmeidler, Hugo Sonnenschein
Publication date: 1978
Social Choice; Preference Analysis; Social Welfare Functions; Dictatorial; Independence of Irrevelant Alternatives; Manipulability; Strategy Proofness
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