Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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Publication:4262868
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00083zbMath0948.91042MaRDI QIDQ4262868
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00083
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