A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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Publication:4302547
DOI10.2307/2951733zbMath0820.90139MaRDI QIDQ4302547
Publication date: 21 August 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=economicsresrpt
91A12: Cooperative games
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