Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment

DOI10.2307/2951507zbMath0813.90144OpenAlexW1538994871MaRDI QIDQ4316534

Christophe Chamley, Douglas Gale

Publication date: 29 May 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951507

zbMATH Keywords

delayinvestmentperiod length\(N\)-player gamepure informational externality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44) Games of timing (91A55)

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