The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing
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Publication:4316536
DOI10.2307/2951509zbMath0812.90032MaRDI QIDQ4316536
Michael H. Riordan, Luís M. B. Cabral
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951509
dynamic oligopoly; learning curve; predatory pricing; price-setting, differentiated duopoly; unique and symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91E40: Memory and learning in psychology
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