Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

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Publication:4446339

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00239zbMath1064.91509OpenAlexW3125999389MaRDI QIDQ4446339

Kenneth Hendricks, Robert H. Porter, Joris Pinkse

Publication date: 22 March 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00239




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