Efficient Auctions
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Publication:4495443
DOI10.1162/003355300554755zbMath0960.91029MaRDI QIDQ4495443
Partha Dasgupta, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 10 August 2000
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554755
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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