Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00228zbMath1026.91034MaRDI QIDQ4531028

Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00228

zbMATH Keywords

voting rules; voting procedures; candidates; strategic candidacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

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