Search With Adverse Selection

DOI10.3982/ECTA9969zbMath1419.91443MaRDI QIDQ4613390

Asher Wolinsky, Stephan Lauermann

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsadverse selectionsearch theoryinformation aggregationwinner's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Search theory (90B40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (15)

Efficiency versus optimality in procurement ⋮ Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons ⋮ A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation ⋮ Market-making with search and information frictions ⋮ Bargaining in small dynamic markets ⋮ Seller experimentation and trade ⋮ Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market ⋮ Liquidity and private information in asset markets: to signal or not to signal ⋮ Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets ⋮ Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection ⋮ Undefeated equilibria of the Shi-Trejos-Wright model under adverse selection ⋮ SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

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